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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-2898 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARGARITA DIAZ,  
 
Appellant 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 11-CR-00211) 
District Judge: Honorable Katherine S. Hayden 
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 24, 2012 
___________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 11, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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McKEE, Chief Judge 
 Margarita Diaz appeals a judgment, entered  July 12, 2011, by the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, sentencing her to a twenty-four month 
prison term, and denying her request for a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we only briefly recite 
essential facts.   
 Diaz pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.  Under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, Diaz had a level I criminal history category, and offense level of 17.  That 
combination resulted in an advisory sentencing range of twenty-four to thirty months.  
She requested a downward variance in hopes of obtaining a probationary sentence.  She 
argued that a variance was warranted because she had significant health problems, no 
prior criminal history, and because her daughters, now adults, had been sexually abused 
by her ex-husband.  At Diaz’s sentencing hearing, the District Court discussed and 
considered all of Diaz’s mitigating circumstances, as well as other downward variance 
factors codified under § 3553(a).  The Court rejected Diaz’s argument and found that a 
twenty-four month prison term was warranted.  This appeal followed imposition of 
sentence. 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the reasonableness of the 
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District Court’s sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  This requires that we ensure that the District Court 
“committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range,” and also “consider the substantive reasonableness of 
the sentence imposed.”  Id.  If a “sentence is within the Guidelines range, [an] appellate 
court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.”  Id.  The fact 
that we “might have reasonably concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is 
insufficient to justify reversal.”  Id.  This approach is based on the principle that “the 
sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 
3553(a) in the individual case.”  Id. 
III. 
 The sentencing transcript shows that the District Court correctly calculated the 
Guidelines range, allowed both parties to present their arguments regarding the 
appropriate sentencing range, considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, and thoroughly 
documented its reasoning.  See Appx. at A24-25; Gall, 552 U.S. at 53.  The record also 
refutes Diaz’s claim of substantive error.  The District Court considered whether Diaz’s 
“lack of a criminal history, acceptance of responsibility, familial circumstances, and poor 
health warranted a measure of leniency.”  Brief of Appellant at 12.  The Court analyzed 
those factors, and others listed under § 3553(a), and ultimately concluded that a sentence 
at the bottom of Diaz’s range, rather than below, was warranted.  See Appx. at A25.   
 Contrary to Diaz’s allegations, the sentencing judge was quite sympathetic to her 
individual circumstances.  The judge explained that if “the circumstances of Ms. Diaz’s 
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life [were] less dramatic, perhaps I [would] even be sentencing in the middle of the 
Guideline range, but to the extent that they are genuine circumstances . . . I will sentence 
her at the bottom of the Guideline range . . . I find that it adequately punishes the offense 
. . . [and] to the extent that the deterrence brings that out loud and clear then the public is 
protected from not only Ms. Diaz by her incapacitation for a period of time, but by the 
fact that other people working at Ms. Diaz’s job know she confessed to her crime 
promptly . . . [a]nd the Court imposed the Guideline sentence.”  Appx. at A25. 
IV. 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
